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Article
The Cultural Life of Capital Punishment:
Responsibility and Representation in
Dead Man Walking and Last Dance
Austin Sarat*
For Death must be somewhere in a society; if it is no longer (or less
intensely) in religion, it must be elsewhere; perhaps in this image
which produces Death while trying to preserve life ....
- Roland Barthes'
Every death agony expresses a certain truth . . . . Hence the
insatiable curiosity that drove spectators to the scaffold to witness
the spectacle of sufferings truly endured; there one could decipher
* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Science, Amherst
College. I am grateful to Amrita Basu, Carol Clover, Marianne Constable, Lawrence Douglas,
Tom Dumm, and Joel Handler for helpful comments on a previous draft of this essay.
Another version was published in THE KILLING STATE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN LAW,
POLITICS, AND CULTURE (Austin Sarat ed., 1999).
1. ROLAND BARTHES, CAMERA LUCIDA 92 (Richard Howard trans., Hill & Wang 1981).
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crime and innocence, the past and the future, the here below and
the eternal. It was a moment of truth that all the spectators
questioned: each word, each cry, the duration of the agony, the
resisting body, the life that clung desperately to it, all this
constituted a sign.
-Michel Foucault'
Even a theater of fictional murder is not an innocent theater. The
point, or one of the points, of the murder story is that there can be
no innocence in circumstances that give rise to murderous
impulses-even if the impulses are aroused in mere bystanders,
witnesses, observers; even if the murder is not real.
-- Wendy Lesser 3
I. INTRODUCTION
Punishment, as Nietzsche reminds us, makes us who we are and
constitutes us as particular kinds of subjects The subject constituted
by punishment is watchful, on guard, fearful, even if never directly
subject to the particular pains of state-imposed punishment.' One of
the primary achievements of punishment, to use Nietzsche's vivid
phrase, "is to breed an animal with the right to make promises,"6 that
is, to induce in us a sense of responsibility, a desire and an ability to
properly discharge our responsibilities. Dutiful individuals, guilt-
ridden, morally burdened-these are the creatures that punishment
demands, creatures worthy of being punished.7
Punishment constitutes subjectivity through the complex juridical
mechanisms that put it in motion, as well as the moral tenets and
legal doctrines that legitimate it.' Here too, we can see the centrality
of responsibility.9 The state will only punish responsible agents,
2. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 46 (Alan Sheridan trans., Pantheon
Books 1977) (1975).
3. WENDY LESSER, PICTURES AT AN EXECUTION 23 (1993).
4. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY AND THE GENEALOGY OF
MORALS 211-16 (Francis Golffing trans., Doubleday 1956) (1887).
5. See Thomas Dumm, Fear of Law, 10 STUD. L. POL. & SOC'Y 29 (1990).
6. NIETZSCHE, supra note 4, at 189.
7. Herbert Morris has famously suggested that persons have a moral "right" to be
punished. This right is realized first when "we permit the person to make choices that will
determine what will happen to him and second, when our responses to the person are
responses respecting the person's choices." Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, in
HUMAN RIGHTS 127 (A.I. Meldren ed., 1970).
8. For a useful discussion of the significance of these moral tenets and legal doctrines, see
Jennifer Culbert, Beyond Intention: A Critique of the "Normal" Criminal Agency,
Responsibility, and Punishment in American Death Penalty Jurisprudence, in THE KILLING
STATE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 206 (Austin Sarat ed., 1999).
9. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968). Hart claims that "all
civilized penal systems make liability to punishment for at any rate serious crime dependent
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persons whose "deviant" acts can be said to be a product of
consciousness and will, persons who "could have done otherwise."
As Blackstone put it, "to constitute a crime against human laws,
there must be, first, a vicious will, and, secondly, an unlawful act
consequent upon such vicious will."'" Thus, the apparatus of
punishment depends upon a modernist subject and a conception of
the will that represses or forgets its "uncertain, divided, and opaque"
character."
In addition, because most citizens are not, and will not be, directly
subjected to the state's penal apparatus, punishment creates a
challenge for representation that is deepened to the point of crisis
when the punishment is death.12 Punishment is inscribed in both our
unconscious and our consciousness. It lives in images conveyed, in
lessons taught, in repressed memories, in horrible imaginings. Some
of its horror and controlling power is, in fact, a result of its fearful
invisibility. "Punishment," Foucault reminds us, "[has] become the
most hidden part of the penal process."13 He argues that:
This has several consequences: [Punishment] leaves the domain
of more or less everyday perception and enters that of abstract
consciousness; its effectiveness is seen as resulting from its
inevitability, not from its visible intensity; it is the certainty of
being punished and not the horrifying spectacle of public
punishment that must discourage crime .... As a result, justice
no longer takes public responsibility for the violence that is
bound up with its practice. "
It may very well be, however, that the more punishment is hidden,
the less visible it is, the more power it has to colonize our
imaginative life. We watch; we seek to conjure an image of
punishment; we become particular kinds of spectators, anticipating a
glimpse, at least a partial uncovering of the apparatus of state
discipline.
And what is true of all punishment is particularly true when death
not merely on the fact that the person to be punished has done the outward act of a crime, but
on his having done it in a certain state or frame of mind or will." Id. at 114.
10. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *21. See also ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN
ETHICS 125-28 (W.D. Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1925) (connecting the wrongfulness of
an act to the mental states and dispositions of the actor). In the modem law of criminal
responsibility, the language of a vicious will or depraved state of mind has receded. More
often, criminal intent is framed as a question of fact, the relevant issue being whether the
defendant had knowledge of the likely consequences of the prohibited nature of his act. See
GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING THE CRIMINAL LAW 397 (1978).
11. William Connolly, The Will, Capital Punishment, Cultural War, in THE KILLING
STATE, supra note 8, at 187, 190.
12. For a discussion of the nature of this challenge, see LESSER, supra note 3.




Sarat: The Cultural Life of Capital Punishment
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1999
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 11:153
is a punishment. That the state takes life and how it takes life
insinuates itself into the public imagination, even as the moment of
this exercise of power is hidden from view. 5 This particular exercise
of power helps us understand who we are and what we as a society
are capable of doing. And as Wendy Lesser so skillfully documents,
the hidden moment when the state takes the life of one of its citizens
precipitates, in an age of the hypervisual, a crisis of representation.'6
This crisis occurs as we confront the boundaries of our
representational practices,'7 where we must determine who decides
what can and cannot be seen, and whether particular representations
of the "reality" of the pain on which the penal apparatus depends are
adequate."
The modern execution is carried out behind prison walls. In these
semi-private, sacrificial ceremonies a few selected witnesses are
gathered in a carefully controlled situation to see, and by seeing to
sanctify, the state's taking of the life of one of its citizens. As Richard
Johnson suggests:
In the modern period (from 1800 on), ceremony gradually gave
way to bureaucratic procedure played out behind prison walls,
in isolation from the community. Feelings are absent, or at least
suppressed, in bureaucratically administered executions. With
bureaucratic procedure, there is a functional routine dominated
by hierarchy and task. Officials perform mechanistically before
a small, silent gathering of authorized witnesses. 9
Capital punishment becomes, at best, a hidden reality. It is known, if
at all, by indirection." "The relative privacy of executions nowadays
(even photographs of the condemned man dying are almost
invariably strictly prohibited)," Hugo Bedau notes, "means that the
average American literally does not know what is being done when
15. See Austin Sarat & Aaron Schuster, To See or Not to See: Television, Capital
Punishment, and Law's Violence, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 397 (1995).
16. See LESSER, supra note 3. And, as Dolan and Dumm argue, this crisis of representation
is not limited to the domain of punishment. "[T]he struggle over the representation of politics
in the public spheres of late twentieth-century America has become the single most important
force shaping political life in this country." Frederick Dolan & Thomas Dumm, Introduction
to THE RHETORICAL REPUBLIC: GOVERNING REPRESENTATIONS IN AMERICAN POLITICS 1
(Frederick Dolan & Thomas Dumm eds., 1993).
17. For a discussion of the legal definition of these boundaries in the context of capital
punishment, see Sarat & Schuster, supra note 15, at 417-24.
18. For a general treatment of the difficulty of representing pain, see ELAINE SCARRY,
THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE WORLD (1985). See also Austin
Sarat, Killing Me Softly: Execution and the Technologies for Taking Life, in COURTING
DEATH: THE LEGAL CONSTITUTION OF MORTALITY (Desmond Manderson ed., forthcoming
1999).
19. RICHARD JOHNSON, DEATH WORK: A STUDY OF THE MODERN EXECUTION PROCESS
5 (1990).
20. See FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 9. See also Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The
Mystical Foundation of Authority, 11 CARDOzo L. REV. 925 (1990).
156
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the government, in his name and presumably on his behalf, executes
a criminal."2
While executions have been removed from the public eye for more
than fifty years, in most states capital punishment still must be
witnessed by members of the public in order to be legal. It is this
linkage between violence and the visual that Lesser explores when
she notes that witnesses are "there not just to ensure that the deed is
actually done . . . but to represent and embody the wider public in
whose name the execution is being carried out."22 Thus the state's
power to kill is linked to the imperatives and privileges of
spectatorship. Whatever the means chosen, execution is always a
visual event.
Historically executions were, in Foucault's words, "more than an
act of justice"; they were a "manifestation of force."' They were
always fundamentally about display, and in particular the display of
the majestic, awesome power of sovereignty as it was manifested on
the body of the condemned.24 Public executions functioned as public
theater, but also as a school for citizenship. 5 While the act of
execution linked violence to spectatorship, it also helped constitute
citizens as subjects. On Foucault's account, the drama of execution
produced a sadistic relation between the executioner, the victim, and
the audience. Yet it also contained a pedagogy of power. "The public
execution," Foucault explained,
has a juridico-political function. It is a ceremonial by which a
momentarily injured sovereignty is reconstituted. It restores that
sovereignty by manifesting it at its most spectacular. The public
execution, however hasty and everyday, belongs to a whole
series of great rituals in which power is eclipsed and restored
(coronation, entry of the king into a conquered city, the
submission of rebellious subjects) . . . . [T]here must be an
emphatic affirmation of power and of its intrinsic superiority.
And this superiority is not simply that of right, but that of the
physical strength of the sovereign beating down upon the body
21. HUGO BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 13 (1982).
22. LESSER, supra note 3, at 37.
23. FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 50.
24. One thing that typically has not been a subject of public display has been the
executioner's identity. The anonymous executioner is, at once, a stand-in for the community in
whose name the execution was carried out and a sign of the "shame" attached to those who
turn our bloodlust into blood-thirsty deeds. See GEOFFREY ABBOTr, LORDS OF THE
SCAFFOLD: A HISTORY OF THE EXECUTION (1991); Roger Callois, The Sociology of the
Executioner, in THE COLLEGE OF SOCIOLOGY 233, 247 (Dennis Hollier ed., Betsy Wing trans.,
Univ. of Minn. Press 1988).
25. See PETRUS SPIERENBURG, THE SPECTACLE OF SUFFERING (1984). See also Steven
Wilf, Imagining Justice: Aesthetics and Public Executions in Late Eighteenth-Century England,
5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 51 (1993).
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of his adversary and mastering it ...."
The pleasure of viewing, as well as the instruction in one's relation to
sovereign power, was to be found in witnessing the pain inflicted, as
well as in the hope that seeing the death of another would convey the
meaning and character of death itself.
The excesses of execution and the enthusiastic response of the
attending crowd created an unembarrassed celebration of violence
that knew no law except one person's will materialized on the body
of the condemned." The display of violence was designed to create
fearful, if not obedient, subjects. Execution without a public
audience was, as a result, meaningless. "Not only must the people
know," Foucault claimed, "they must see with their own eyes.
Because they must be made afraid, but also because they must be
witnesses, the guarantors of the punishment, and because they must
to a certain extent take part in it."2 In this understanding of the
relationship of punishment and the people, "the role of the people
was an ambiguous one."29 They were, at once, fearful subjects,
authorizing witnesses, and lustful participants.
Yet the public execution was also an occasion for the exercise of
popular power, if not popular sovereignty. In Foucault's words, "[i]n
the ceremonies of the public execution, the main character was the
people .... "3 It was an occasion on which people could, and did,
mass themselves against the punishment that was to be carried out
before their eyes. Their presence ensured that the act of execution
itself, not just the judgment of death, could be contested31 and that
execution could not be reduced to a bland routine. "[I]t was on this
point," Foucault suggests,
that the people, drawn to the spectacle intended to terrorize it,
could express its rejection of the punitive power and sometimes
revolt. Preventing an execution that was regarded as unjust,
snatching a condemned man from the hands of the executioner,
obtaining his pardon by force, possibly pursuing and assaulting
the executioners, in any case abusing the judges and causing an
26. FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 48-49.
27. See V.A.C. GATRELL, THE HANGING TREE: EXECUTION AND THE ENGLISH PEOPLE
1770-1868, at 56 (1994). See also Peter Fitzpatrick, "Always More to Do": Capital Punishment
and the (de) Composition of Law, in THE KILLING STATE, supra note 8, at 117, 125.
28. FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 58.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 57.
31. As Gatrell argues, "These crowds behaved and spoke in terms which polite observers
grew less able to understand. Many crowds acquiesced in what was done by the law and
affirmed its righteousness. The hanging of murderers was usually approved. But when humbler
people hanged for humble crimes, they could act like a Greek chorus, mocking justice's
pretensions." GATRELL, supra note 27, at 59.
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uproar against the sentence-all of this formed part of the
popular practices that invested, traversed and often overturned
the ritual of public execution ... . It was evident that the great
spectacle of punishment ran the risk of being rejected by the
very people to whom it was addressed.32
Today the death penalty has been transformed from a dramatic
spectacle to a cool, bureaucratic operation, and the role of the public
has become strictly limited and controlled.33 The chance of either
disruption or rejection, as a result, has been minimized. The public
has been displaced by a small, select, and carefully controlled group
of witnesses, who are provided a fleeting glimpse of the rituals of
state sponsored death as it is turned into a problem of
administration. Thus, the problem of representation, spectatorship,
and the public's role remains.
What we know about the way law administers death comes in the
most highly mediated way as rumors, reports, accounts of the
voiceless expression of the body of the condemned-or it comes in
images and representations made available in popular culture. There
it lives in its fictive re-creations.
My interest in this Article is to make a particular intervention in
scholarship about the death penalty,34 and to turn away from
abstract, philosophical questions about the morality or legality of
state killing 5 and narrow policy-relevant research36 toward an
analysis of the cultural life of capital punishment.37 My work builds
on David Garland's suggestion that we should attend to the "cultural
role" of legal practices, to their ability to "create social meaning and
thus shape social worlds," and that among these practices none is
more important than how we punish.38 Punishment, Garland tells us,
32. FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 59-60, 63.
33. See JOHNSON, supra note 19, at 5.
34. Franklin Zimring recently called on scholars to broaden the focus of death penalty
research and claimed that the increasing unresponsiveness of policy-makers and courts to
social science evidence concerning capital punishment sets researchers "free of the constraints
that might apply if such work was relevant to immediate decisions on executions." Franklin
Zimring, On the Liberating Virtues of Irrelevance, 27 L. & SOC'Y REV. 9, 12 (1993).
35. For two fine examples of such work, see Robert Burt, Democracy, Equality, and the
Death Penalty, 36 NoMOS 80 (1994); and Hugo Adam Bedau, The Eighth Amendment, Human
Dignity, and the Death Penalty, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS 145 (Michael J. Meyer &
William A. Parent eds., 1992).
36. See, e.g., DAVID BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY (1990).
37. This approach to the study of capital punishment is more fully described in Austin
Sarat, Capital Punishment as a Fact of Legal, Political, and Cultural Life, Introduction to THE
KILLING STATE, supra note 8, at 3. For an important precursor to my approach, see LOuIS
MASUR, RITES OF EXECUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN CULTURE, 1776-1865 (1989). See also JOHN SLOOP, THE CULTURAL PRISON
(1996).
38. David Garland, Punishment and Culture: The Symbolic Dimensions of Criminal Justice,
11 STUD. L. POL. & SOC'Y 191,191 (1991).
Sarat
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"helps shape the overarching culture and contribute to the
generation and regeneration of its terms. ' 39 Punishment is a set of
signifying practices that "teaches, clarifies, dramatizes and
authoritatively enacts some of the most basic moral-political
categories and distinctions which help shape our symbolic
universe."4O Punishment lives in culture through its pedagogical
effects, and it teaches us how to think about such basic social
categories as intention, responsibility, and injury. In addition, it
models socially appropriate ways of responding to injuries done to
US.
The semiotics of punishment is all around us, not just in the
architecture of the prison, or the speech made by a judge as she
sends someone to the penal colony, but in both "high" and
"popular" culture iconography, in novels, television, and film. 1
Punishment has traditionally been one of the great subjects of
cultural production, suggesting the powerful allure of humankind's
fall from grace and of our prospects for redemption. But perhaps the
word "our" is inaccurate here, since Durkheim 2 and Mead,43 among
others, remind us that it is through practices of punishment that
cultural boundaries are drawn. Solidarity is created by marking
difference between self and other, though dis-identification as much
as imagined connection. "[M]ass-mediated representations of
prisoners function as a public display of the transgression of cultural
norms; as such, they are a key site at which one may investigate the
relationship of the individual to the culture in general, as well as the
cultural articulation of 'proper behavior."'" 4
This is also true when the punishment is death. Execution is, even
now, an occasion for rich symbolization, for the production of public
images of evil or of unruly freedom, and for fictive re-creations of
the scene of death in popular culture. 5
I examine the cultural life of capital punishment through a reading
of two recent films about capital punishment: Dead Man Walking
and Last Dance.' I am interested in the cultural politics of these
39. Id. at 193.
40. Id. at 195.
41. On the aesthetics of punishment, see Wilf, supra note 25, at 54.
42. See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (George Simpson trans.,
The Free Press 1964) (1933).
43. See George Herbert Mead, The Psychology of Punitive Justice, 23 AM. J. Soc. 577
(1918).
44. SLOOP, supra note 37, at 3.
45. See, e.g., NORMAN MAILER, THE EXECUTIONER'S SONG (1979).
46. DEAD MAN WALKING (Polygram Filmed Entertainment 1996); LAST DANCE
(Touchstone Pictures 1996). These films appeared at about the same time and were intended
for a mass audience. They came out at a time of deepening public support for capital
punishment and an increasing impatience with the frequent delays between death sentences
160
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films and the way they seek to convey knowledge of capital
punishment. How is the death penalty represented in these films and
what connections do they forge among death, spectatorship, and the
constitution of legal subjectivity? What do they suggest about the
legitimacy of state killing?
To answer these questions, I analyze the way these films speak to
two basic conceptual categories to which Garland directs our
attention. The first of these is individual responsibility and its utility
in explaining the causes of, as well as directing our responses to,
crime. Dead Man Walking and Last Dance do not explore the social
and structural factors that some believe must be addressed inresponding to crime;4 instead, they are preoccupied with the
question of personal responsibility. To the extent that they contain
an explanation of crime and a justification for punishment, it is to be
located in the autonomous choices of particular agents. While
building dramatic tension around the question of whether their hero
or heroine deserves the death penalty, these films convey a powerful
dual message: First, legal subjects can, and will, be held responsible
for their acts; second, they can, and should, internalize and accept
responsibility.
Last Dance and Dead Man Walking depend upon categories-
agency, will, and responsibility- the stability and coherence of which
are today increasingly called into question.48 Yet they evade rather
than engage those questions. These films are deeply invested in the
constitution of a modernist, responsible subject as the proper object
and executions. As any attentive American who lived through the 1970s, 80s, and 90s knows,
the politics of law and order have been at center stage for a long time. From Richard Nixon's
"law and order" rhetoric to Bill Clinton's pledge to represent people who "work hard and play
by the rules," crime has been such an important issue that some now argue that we are
"governing through crime." See Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime, in THE CRIME
CONUNDRUM 171, 174 (Lawrence M. Friedman & George Fisher eds., 1997). In the effort to
show that one is tough on crime, the symbolism of capital punishment has been crucial. These
films are but two examples.
Last Dance and Dead Man Walking are important interventions in the debate about capital
punishment, but, as I will argue, their interventions, while significant at the level of some of our
most crucial cultural categories, are quite circumscribed in the questions they raise about
capital punishment.
I make no claims here about the representativeness of these films. My purpose is to read
them as cultural productions. Yet it might be worth noting that both films are examples of one
type of death penalty film, which I label the "sentimental tale." These films focus on a
biographical or autobiographical reconstruction of the condemned, raising questions of
responsibility and repentance. Other death penalty films, which I label "injustice tales," take as
their central thematic the question of whether the condemned is really guilty, that is, whether
an innocent person will be executed. A classic of this genre is I WANT TO LIVE (United Artists
1958).
47. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA (1995).
48. See Connolly, supra note 11, at 158. See also WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY:
POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY (1995); Homi Bhabha, Minority Maneuvers and
Unsettled Negotiations, 3 CRITICAL INQUIRY 431 (1997).
Sarat
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of punishment, a subject who, as Nietzsche would have it, has the
"right to make promises." They suggest that there can be, and is, a
tight linkage between crime and punishment, such that those
personally responsible for the former can be legitimately subject to
the latter.
The second conceptual category to which this paper speaks
involves representation, especially how the death penalty is
represented to us, and the cultural politics of representational
gestures. While Dead Man Walking and Last Dance initially appear
to deploy complex representational practices that call attention to
the partiality and limits of all representations,49 they ultimately
depend on a representational realism that allows viewers to think
that they can know the reality of the crimes for which death is a
punishment and of the death penalty itself. Instead of inviting us to
imagine the scene of death and its significance," they seek to inspire
confidence that their viewers can "know" the truth about capital
punishment through their "you are there" representations of
execution.
Yet the death penalty plays an uncanny role in film, pointing to the
limits of representation, to the limits of our ability to "know" death51
and, as a result, to our inability to be sure whether state killing is an
appropriate, proportional response to the crimes that appear to
justify it. Whenever and however death is present in film, it reminds
us that, in this domain, seeing is not, and cannot be, knowing.
Traditionally, the cultural politics of state killing have served to
shore up status distinctions and distinguish particular ways of life
from others. Thus, it is not surprising that today the death penalty
and death penalty films sit at an important fault line in our
49. The very title of the film Dead Man Walking emblematizes a crisis of representation.
The title invites the viewer to imagine the impossible-a dead man walking-and it conveys
the indeterminacy of death in the sense that death row inmates are described as dead men
before they are actually put to death. I am grateful to Susan Schmeiser for pointing this out to
me.
50. Perhaps Edmund Burke had it right when he suggested that in certain domains the
imagination is more powerful than the senses. "The imagination," he said, "is the most
extensive province of pleasure and pain as it is the region of our fears and hopes and all of our
passions." EDMUND BURKE, A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN AND OUR
IDEAS OF THE SUBLIME AND THE BEAUTIFUL 31 (James Boulton ed., Routledge 1958) (1759).
Envisioning the unknown "creates a terror unequalled by actually seeing the object of fear."
See Wilf, supra note 25, at 64.
51. "Our death, which is intended for us alone, is the one experience of our life that we
can't directly experience .... We can have access to the event only indirectly, by extrapolating
from the experience of others." LESSER, supra note 3, at 135.
52. Writing about the end of public executions in the mid-nineteenth century, Masur notes
that it "marked the triumph of a certain code of conduct and set of social attitudes among the
middle and upper classes; it symbolized a broader trend toward social privatization and class
segmentation; it turned the execution of criminals into an elite event centered around class and
gender exclusion rather than communal instruction .... " MASUR, supra note 37, at 6.
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contemporary culture wars. 3 In the way they address questions of
responsibility and in the representational practices on which they
depend, Dead Man Walking and Last Dance (whatever the
intentions of those who made them) enact and depend upon a
conservative cultural politics," in which large political questions
about what state killing does to our law, politics, and culture are
bracketed55 and in which viewers are positioned as jurors deliberating
solely on the question of whether a particular person merits death. 6
While they raise questions about the calculus of desert that justifies
the death penalty in particular cases, they support the conceptual
foundations of capital punishment, and they legitimate its place in
America's penal apparatus.
1I. THE SCENE OF THE CRIME AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
RESPONSIBILITY
Every story about punishment is inevitably a story about crime,
about its causes and the process of assigning responsibility for it.
How we think about punishment is in part a function of what we
know and think about the crimes that give rise to it. The prevailing
common sense suggests that the severity of punishment should be
proportional to the seriousness of the crime and that punishment
should only be deployed against responsible agents,57 against free
and moral agents, persons capable of knowing right from wrong and
choosing to do one or the other. As former Supreme Court Justice
Robert Jackson once explained:
53. In this context to favor capital punishment is, so it is said, to be a defender of
traditional morality against rampant permissivism, of the fights of the innocent against the
rights of the guilty, of state power against its anarchic critics. To oppose it is to carry the
burden of explaining why the state should not kill the killers, of producing a new theory of
responsibility and of responsible punishment, and of humanizing inhuman deeds. Proponents
of state killing, Connolly contends, put aside "the instability [of] categories of will and
responsibility .. " Connolly, supra note 11, at 200. At the same time, they highlight "the
theatricality of the state's power to kill, and the promise to make state punishment 'morally
proportional' to the act." Id. at 35.
54. Others have pointed toward such a reading of Dead Man Walking. "The movie Dead
Man Walking ... fails to deliver the same unequivocal abolitionist punch as the book....
[V]iewers are torn about whether or not this is even a film with an anti-capital punishment
point of view." See Carole Shapiro, Do or Die: Does Dead Man Walking Run?, 30 U.S.F. L.
REV. 1143, 1144 (1996).
55. As Baudrillard suggests, in regard to capital punishment, "the thought of the right
(hysterical reaction) and the thought of the left (rational humanism) are both equally removed
from the symbolic configuration where crime, madness and death are modalities of
exchange .... JEAN BAUDRILLARD, SYMBOLIC EXCHANGE AND DEATH 169 (lain Hamilton
Grant trans., Sage 1993) (1976). And all of this is carried on against the background of cultural
divides that are becoming ever more intense as they become more complex and unpredictable.
56. Shapiro contends that Dead Man Walking "leaves the audience clueless about the
systematic inequities and arbitrariness" of the death penalty. Shapiro, supra note 54, at 1145.
57. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
58. See Morris, supra note 7, at 127.
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The contention that injury can amount to crime only when
inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as
universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in
freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of
the normal individual to choose between good and evil.... ."
This understanding of crime and punishment depends on what
Stephen Carter calls "bilateral individualism."' As Carter explains:
The dominant culture's understanding of victimhood awards the
status of victim to someone who loses something.., because of
the predation of someone else. Victimization, then, is the result
of concrete, individual acts by identifiable transgressors ....
[The dominant understanding] invents a reality in which the
only victims are those who have suffered at the hands of
transgressors, and in which any sanctions should be directed
toward deterring or punishing those transgressors... . To one
who accepts this vision, a world like ours, one in which so many
violent crimes occur and go unpunished by the state, must seem
a world in which the forces of order have lost control ....
People are afraid of crime and are afraid of becoming victims.
They want to strike back at someone to liberate themselves
from fear... . [B]ilateral individualism can rationalize the need
to strike back only by insisting that... transgressors are real,
individual people, and other individuals have the right to turn
their assaults aside.61
In this vision the legitimacy of punishment depends on a relatively
precise moral calculus in which punishment is a measured and
proportionate response to crime. Linking crime and punishment is
the supposed reality of individual responsibility.
A second explanation for crime, Carter notes, complicates the
calculus of punishment by altering the bilateral individualist's
straightforward story of responsibility. It does so by pointing away
from individual agency toward the sweep of history and the
differential positions of the social groups from which criminals (and
often their victims) come.62 This "enterprise takes the form of a
search for explanations rather than a search for villainous agents and
attributions of blame; the remedial enterprise is directed to altering
59. Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
60. Stephen Carter, When Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 421 (1988).
Robert Gordon calls this conception of responsibility "narrow-agency." It frames wrongs as
"done by specific perpetrators to specific victims; the remedy is the limited and negative
retributive sanction of the criminal process." Robert W. Gordon, Undoing Historical Injustice,
in JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE IN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 35, 36 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R.
Kearns eds., 1996).
61. Carter, supra note 60, at 421-22.
62. See id. at 426.
12
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol11/iss1/4
1999]
institutions, systems, and incentives rather than to exacting
punishment .... 63 A structuralist perspective is less intent on
carefully reconstructing the crime and assigning personal
responsibility; instead, it uses the fact of crime to highlight the need
to alter social structures.
In the cultural life of capital punishment, at least as it is
exemplified in Dead Man Walking and Last Dance, Carter's bilateral
individualism, I will argue, is the prevailing motif. Because stories of
the lives and deeds of particular persons have much more dramatic
appeal than stories in which causation is impersonal and diffuse and
the source of crime is located in social structure, 6' it is not surprising
that these films provide narratives of crime and punishment that
focus on describing what a particular person did and on fixing
responsibility on a blameworthy agent.6"
In popular culture the linkage between crime and punishment can
be, and regularly is, made visual. This is certainly the case in the
films under consideration. They focus on people already condemned
to death, living on death row, whose legal guilt is not in doubt, and
whose crime is graphically and repeatedly presented to us. Both are
tales of persons coming to terms with their responsibility for
gruesome crimes. In Dead Man Walking, Matthew Poncelet (played
by Sean Penn) has been sentenced for his part in a double murder, in
which a classically clean-cut boy and girl are accosted while parking
in the woods. They are then led off into a clearing, where the girl is
raped and repeatedly stabbed, and both ultimately are shot
execution style. In Last Dance, Cindy Liggitt (played by Sharon
Stone) is on death row for killing two people with a crowbar during a
burglary of their home.
Last Dance and Dead Man Walking ask us how one human being
can take the life of another. What forces propel such "evil" deeds?
They inquire about the capacity of spectators to recognize a shared
humanity, to empathize, and to care for the condemned. They do so
63. Gordon, supra note 60, at 38.
64. Such stories are precisely the kind that defense lawyers in capital cases typically deploy
in the penalty phase. See Austin Sarat, Speaking of Death: Narratives of Violence in Capital
Trials, 27 L. & Soc'y REV. 19 (1993). See also James Doyle, The Lawyer's Art:
"Representation" in Capital Cases, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 417, 428-34 (1996).
65. Whether one favors individualist or structuralist explanations, it is important to
recognize that there is an asymmetry between the cultural life of crime and of punishment.
While we are bombarded with representations of crime, punishment, as I suggested above, is
almost invisible. See ALISON YOUNG, IMAGINING CRIME 15-16 (1996). The scene of
criminality is a familiar one, a common though not unproblematic sight for most citizens; the
scene of punishment is neither familiar nor common. The result is that the bridge between
crime and punishment works primarily at the rhetorical level, or at the level of imagination.
Seeing the scene of crime, confronted with its graphic depiction, we are left to identify a
responsible agent and imagine a just punishment.
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through pairing the condemned with a cinematic "buddy."' Each
film shows the relationship of one other person-a lawyer and a
nun-to the condemned. This person becomes the stand-in for the
film's viewers. 7 Can we have as much understanding and compassion
as that person? Should we? Should it matter to us whether Cindy
Liggitt or Matthew Poncelet accept responsibility for the crimes for
which they already have been found legally responsible?
In Dead Man Walking and Last Dance images of the crime play a
large role in suggesting how these questions should be answered. The
crime is presented in a variety of ways and reenacted repeatedly
throughout both films in a duet with the impending execution. Visual
equivalences are created, and the viewer is positioned alternatively
as crime-scene investigator, juror, omnipotent truth seeker, and
voyeur. Through their preoccupations with the scene of criminality
these films establish the background conditions against which
responsibility and blameworthiness can be fixed and punishment
ultimately assessed. Both bring a "who-did-what-to-whom" logic to
bear on criminal and victim, bracketing questions about history and
structure that would complicate the assignment of responsibility and
the assessment of punishment. Additionally, by presenting repeat,
but incomplete, reenactments of the crime, in which the "truth" of
what happened only gradually unfolds, these films highlight the
partiality and problematics of viewing, seeing, and knowing. Yet this
suggestion is undone in climatic scenes that ultimately reassure the
viewer that the whole truth has been revealed.
While the use of the repeated reimagining of the crime puts us at
the scene as both potential victim and killer, we see the crime most
often from the perspective of the killer, first approaching the hapless
victim and then acting out a murderous passion. What Young says
about Psycho and Silence of the Lambs is also true for Dead Man
Walking and Last Dance as well: "[W]hile offered temporarily the
experience of identifying with the victim, the spectator is
incorporated into the film much more significantly as an accomplice
of the killer .... [This] identificatory relation is achieved through an
association of the spectator's look with the gaze of the cinematic
66. Many death penalty films are structured around a relationship between the condemned
and another person who befriends them or takes up their cause. In these films we are invited to
see the condemned through that person. Harding contends that "these secondary characters
are pivotal" in that they are often able to see the human face behind the monstrous deeds that
bring someone to death row. Roberta Harding, Celluloid Death: Cinematic Depictions of
Capital Punishment, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 1167, 1172 (1996). If these characters can see beyond
the crime, then perhaps so can the viewers of the films.
67. In each there is also a problem of how we identify with their caring for and about the
condemned. In Dead Man Walking it is Sister Helen's deep religious conviction that moves
her; in Last Dance it is Rick's growing attraction to Cindy that moves him.
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apparatus."' We are powerless to stop the violence that unfolds
before us, and we are cinematically reminded of that powerlessness
since we see crimes already committed, for which the murderer is
now in the custody of the state. So we are safe. The deed is done; we
cannot rewrite history.
In Last Dance the crime is presented in various ways-through
photographic stills seen by different characters and in moving images
presented in flashback. Each of these techniques has particular
significance in focusing the viewer's attention on issues of
responsibility and representation. Thus, when we first see the crime
in the form of crime scene photographs glimpsed over the shoulder
of Rick Hayes-lawyer, ne'er-do-well brother of the governor's
chief-of-staff, and new employee of the state clemency board-the
camera gives us but a brief view of the bloodied body of a man lying
on the floor, a fleeting suggestion of what happened. It pans quickly
to Rick's face and pauses as he registers the horror of what he sees.
This register marks one dimension of the responsible subject,
someone who identifies with the victim and knows, at the deepest
level, that he or she is incapable of doing such gruesome deeds.
We see more of the crime scene when Rick's first romantic interest
in the film, Jill, knocks over a file in his apartment, spilling its
contents onto the floor. Again there is a quick shot of the bloody
photos now strewn on the floor as if in a photo array presented to a
court.69 This time the camera cuts to Jill to catch the same distressed
and disgusted look that had marked Rick's first sight of the
photographs-the same reminder of the way "respectability"
depends on just the right combination of responsibility and
inhibition.
The looks on the faces of Rick and Jill are "our" looks. They
establish a shared understanding of the horror of a sudden,
murderous death,7" and they represent our reaction to the horrible
violence that lurks just beyond law's boundary.7 Responsible people
are repelled by the kind of violence depicted in the photographic
representation of Cindy Liggitt's crime."
68. Alison Young, Murder in the Eyes of the Law, 17 STUD. L. POL. & SOc'y 31, 44-45
(1997).
69. On the power of such photographic evidence, see Kristin Bumiller, Real
Violence/Body Fictions (1991) (unpublished paper on file with author). See also Jennifer
Mnookin, The Image of Truth: Photographic Evidence and the Power of Analogy, 10 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 1 (1998).
70. See Young, supra note 68, at 32.
71. For a discussion of the uses of this imagery in capital trials, see Sarat, supra note 64, at
30.
72. For an empirical examination of the reactions of jurors in capital cases to photographic
evidence, see Austin Sarat, Violence, Representation, and Responsibility in Capital Trials: The
View From the Jury, 70 IND. L.J. 1103 (1995).
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The baseline of responsibility established by Rick and Jill's
innocent gaze does two things. First, it provides a standard for
viewers to judge Cindy as she later relives the crime in several
flashbacks. It also sets up an argument that Rick makes later in the
film, namely, that those who use capital punishment to respond to
murder-and are not repulsed by the violence it does-are no
different from those they condemn. As he puts it talking to the
governor about Cindy, "We never gave her a chance to become like
us. Now we've become like her."73
This is a key moment in Last Dance. It provides a glimpse of what
a structuralist response to crime would look like in popular culture.
Moreover, it challenges individualism by presenting the subject's
position as fluid, contingent, and reversible. In Rick's line,
responsibility is temporarily shifted from the criminal to those who
occupy respectable positions in society; "we" are responsible for
denying Cindy the chance to be respectable. Moreover, those who
use capital punishment as their way of responding to murder become
murderers themselves.
Yet, as Last Dance proceeds, the structuralist critique fades. Rick
becomes preoccupied with his own tragic romantic attraction to
Cindy, an attraction signaled by the film's title. More importantly,
Cindy herself counters Rick's initial structuralist response by
insisting on her own responsibility.
At the level of the film's representational practices, the
photographic stills through which we first see the crime in Last
Dance represent it as an evidentiary matter. We see the evidence as a
jury would see it.75 The still photographs freeze and partialize the
scene of death, allowing us to know the pain of the victim through
the most graphic representations of the wounds inflicted.76 Yet they
also serve as a reminder that, when we see motion pictures of the
crime, we are being given a privileged view available to us only in
our access to the memories of the film's central characters. Motion
73. This moment is a reminder of the stark fact that when law runs out, sitting just beyond
is the executive's plenary power to pardon. See KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS:
JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1989). The haunting specter of executive
clemency depends on the will of a single person, who sits as an omnipotent force with the
power to grant life. To enlist this power, as Natalie Zemon Davis reminds us, requires the
fashioning of persuasive narratives, narratives of the kind that Rick tries to provide for the
governor. See NATALIE ZEMON DAVIS, FICTION IN THE ARCHIVES: PARDON TALES AND
THEIR TELLERS IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE (1987). Yet as Last Dance so vividly
demonstrates, no narrative can guarantee clemency.
74. This is, of course, the classic anti-capital punishment argument made by Albert Camus.
See Albert Camus, Reflections on the Guillotine, in REFLECTIONS ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
125 (Albert Camus & Arthur Koestler eds., 1957).
75. See Sarat, supra note 72, at 1122.
76. Scarry contends that we can only know pain through images of weapons and wounds.
See SCARRY, supra note 18, at 16.
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pictures serve as the revealed truth of the crime; they fix our gaze as
coextensive with Cindy's recollection of the crime.
We see the crime through Cindy's eyes twice: once as she looks
through an art book at a dark and evocative painting of a woman
being tormented for her sins; the second time in a dream that
disturbs and awakens her. It is in these scenes that her insistence on
the appropriateness of the logic of free will, agency, and
responsibility becomes clear. The first time we get an abbreviated
look as she bludgeons one of her victims, Matt McQuire, and sends
him hurtling through a glass door. In this moment of murder she
appears to be in a trance, until she is finally interrupted by her
accomplice's call to stop. The second time we get a more complete
picture, a picture not available to the crime's victims or to the jury.
We see Cindy and her accomplice driving toward the house where
the crime will occur, both of them getting high by smoking crack
cocaine.77 We watch the entry into the house and helplessly follow
Cindy as she goes into the bedroom where Debbie Hunt, the other
victim, awakens, recognizes Cindy, and yells, "It's you, you fucking
whore. Get out of my house." Cindy silences her with a blow to the
skull.
It is in Cindy's deeply troubled reactions to these graphic
recollections that the narrative of responsibility unfolds. They both
connect her with Rick and Jill, and, through them, to us. They serve
as a point of critical engagement with Rick's assertion that "we" are
somehow to blame. Though she is a murderer, she is disturbed,
indeed haunted, by what she has done. While Rick, the lawyer and
clemency investigator, is eager to forgive her crime or to attribute
responsibility to her troubled childhood and the fact that she was
high on crack at the time of the killing, Cindy, who has already been
found legally responsible, insists on taking responsibility. As she
explains to Rick:
That night [the night of the killing] is inside me like a giant
shadow. I hated everything I didn't have, and Debbie Hunt used
to rub my nose in it. All that hate blew everything apart. I killed
them. I killed myself. I know what I did. I can't change that. I
can only change myself. I guess there are some things that can't
be forgiven.
In an odd forecast of the drama that would unfold around Karla
Faye Tucker,7" and in a recapitulation of Carter's bilateral
77. A truth is here revealed to the film's viewers that was not available at her trial, since
evidence of her use of crack before the crime was suppressed by an incompetent judge during
the penalty phase.
78. On the transformation of Karla Faye Tucker, see Beverly Lowry, The Good Bad Girl,
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individualism, Cindy focuses attention on an "I" who acted. She
insists that no one is to blame but herself.79
This insistence on taking responsibility marks a change that has
already occurred in Cindy, and it reminds us that she, like us, is an
agent capable of being held responsible. That she is guilt-ridden and
morally burdened makes her an icon of modernist subjectivity, a
subjectivity fully embracing the burden of its will put to "evil"
purposes." Moreover, it establishes the dramatic question that
haunts the film: Does she really deserve to die for her crime?
In Dead Man Walking the drama of responsibility unfolds in a
more conventional way. Instead of the criminal resisting the
structuralist analysis of his interlocutor, it is the latter who, in this
film, speaks the language of responsibility against the evasions and
deflections of the condemned. But in this film, as in Last Dance, the
viewer's attention is fixed on a gradual unfolding of the "truth" of
the crime against which responsibility can be measured and
punishment fixed.
The crime is seen primarily through the imagination of the main
character, Sister Helen Prejean. As in Last Dance, the scene of the
crime provides a recurring dramatic frame within which the question
of whether Matthew Poncelet deserves to die can be posed. The
repeated reenactment of the crime in a series of flashbacks spread
throughout the film is key to the construction of Poncelet's
subjectivity. It delineates the difference between being responsible
and taking responsibility.
As to the question of innocence and guilt, law is indifferent to the
distinction between being responsible and taking responsibility. The
Fifth Amendment protects the accused from being forced to take
responsibility, in part because being "forced" to take responsibility
eviscerates whatever moral significance such a gesture would have.8"
While under current Supreme Court doctrine being an accessory is
sufficient to create culpability for first degree murder and eligibility
NEW YORKER, Feb. 9,1998, at 60.
79. Cindy thus plays out a powerful theme in contemporary legality. The more law is
challenged by theories that insist on the contingency and fluidity of identity, or on the
effacement of the subject in modern conditions of danger, see, e.g., THOMAS DUMM,
DEMOCRACY AND PUNISHMENT: DISCIPLINARY ORIGINS OF THE UNITED STATES 7-11
(1987), the more it seeks to affirm "that an individual is completely responsible for his
actions... [Law] needs an autonomous, rational, self-determining individual to assume the
position of the cause of events that disrupt the pattern of everyday life in an ordered society.
And, it must affirm this figure without skepticism .. " Culbert, supra note 8, at 29.
80. See, e.g., William Connolly, Evil and the Imagination of Wholeness, in LIBERAL
MODERNISM AND DEMOCRATIC INDIVIDUALITY 112 (Austin Sarat & Dana Villa eds., 1996).
81. Peter Brooks, Storytelling Without Fear? Confession in Law and Literature, in LAW'S
STORIES 115 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996).
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for the death penalty,82 the assumption that taking responsibility has
enormous significance in constituting the moral quality of the subject
is as crucial to the dramatic unfolding of Dead Man Walking as it was
in Last Dance.
Will Matthew Poncelet confess? Will he admit his true
involvement and genuine culpability for the murders for which he
was sentenced? Or will he go to his death still insisting that he was
only an accessory swept up in the evil deeds of another? These
questions, rather than any broader effort to understand the society of
which his crime is a part or the ongoing political and legal problems
with the death penalty, provide the dramatic frame of the film. As
Shapiro contends, "the confession is, in fact, the pivot on which the
movie balances .... It might also be said that without the confession,
Dead Man Walking would give viewers little reason for opposing the
execution since this sympathy is largely dependent upon the
defendant's act of contrition."83
Dead Man Walking is more concerned with Sister Helen Prejean's
ability to tame the savage beast in Matthew Poncelet, a heroic effort
in the face of death, than with the question of whether state killing is
compatible with our Constitution and our commitments as a political
and legal community.84 Insisting that legal responsibility is not
enough to heal the wounds inflicted-or to mark a soul that is
saved-is the work of Sister Helen, the spiritual counselor to
Poncelet and the person whose story Dead Man Walking tells. Thus,
Sister Helen informs the parents of one of Poncelet's victims, "I want
him to take responsibility for what he did."
Whereas in Last Dance the lawyer tries to diminish the
responsibility of the condemned, in Dead Man Walking Sister Helen
works to constitute Matthew Poncelet as a fully responsible agent.
She does so, in part, by imaginatively reconstructing the crime and
trying to figure out exactly what he did, if not why he did it. A
chronology of such imaginative reconstructions provides the site at
which responsibility gradually can be assessed. It also continually
reminds the viewer of the salience of the "who-did-what-to-whom"
problematic.
Dead Man Walking begins the visual reconstruction of the crime
after Sister Helen has heard a verbal description of Poncelet's deeds
from the jaded prison chaplain who warns her, "There is no romance
here sister. This ain't no Jimmy Cagney 'I've been wrongly accused.
If only I had someone who believed in me' nonsense. They [the men
82. For an elaboration of the state of the doctrine, see Culbert, supra note 8, at 207.
83. Shapiro, supra note 54, at 1153.
84. See id.; see also Harding, supra note 66, at 1177.
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on death row] are all con men and they will take advantage of you
every way they can." 5 This is a warning to the viewer as well. Be
wary. Do not be taken in. Remember who you are about to meet and
why he is on death row. Unlike in Last Dance, where Cindy Liggitt is
presented as torturing herself into responsible subjectivity, Poncelet
is the unrepentant con man.
As Sister Helen leaves the chaplain and walks into the prison for
her first meeting with Poncelet, the film moves back and forth
between her observation of the strange world she is about to enter
and scenes of the crime, set apart in black and white. We approach a
car parked in the woods; we see the barrel of a rifle; we see a shot
fired, followed by the legs of someone lying face down, then a
twisted and bruised arm, and finally, a knife raised in slow motion in
three repeated sequences and one dramatic, Psycho-like stabbing
gesture. But in none of these scenes do we see the faces of the killers.
We know something horrible has happened but we cannot yet fix
responsibility. The anonymity of the criminal and the lack of
narrative cohesion in this scene serve to keep our gaze fixed on the
horror of the act that is presented to us and to warn us that we, like
Sister Helen herself, are not yet in a position to judge or to assign
blame.
After each image of the unfolding crime in this scene, the camera
cuts back to Sister Helen's increasingly disturbed facial expression, a
kind of "what am I doing here; what have I got myself into" look.
What remains undecided is whether her distress registers her image
of the crime or the prospect of meeting the killer face-to-face, or
both. But it is nonetheless important to note that at this point Sister
Helen has not yet imagined the actual killing or the bloody bodies.
The camera's move to black and white and to slow motion suggests
that we are seeing a fantasy. It is an incomplete fantasy, though one
already filled with dread even as it brackets the most visually
horrible image of the crime. Without its most graphic detail, the
scene of the crime is registered on Sister Helen's face as it would be
on ours. Like Rick and Jill in Last Dance, hers is the face of the
responsible subject reacting to horror.
In its gradual and partial reconstructions of the crime, Dead Man
Walking also seems to highlight the problematics of viewing and
representation. Perspective is everything; nothing is complete or
certain. Thus, we see the crime sometimes only briefly, as when,
85. The film presents a transposition from the verbal to the visual where the verbal is at
least initially given priority as an accurate rendition of events. On the significance of such
transpositions, see CAROL EMERSON, BORIS GODUNOv: TRANSPOSITIONS OF A RUSSIAN
THEME (1986). Jimmy Cagney also plays the lead in ANGELS WITH DIRTY FACES (Warner
Brothers 1938), one of the earliest death penalty films.
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during a hearing of the pardon board, we look over the shoulders of
its members as they listen to arguments about whether they should
recommend clemency for Poncelet. The prosecutor arguing against
clemency hands crime-scene photos to each of the board members.
We see parts of several of the photos, shown in color to mark their
status as representations of the real, as the camera moves behind the
row of chairs on which the board members are seated. When the
camera moves to the front we see them going through the photos,
but the wide angle of the shot makes it hard to discern their facial
expressions. Finally, we return to a position behind the pardon board
and get a close view of a single photo of the naked body of a young
woman bloodied by multiple stab wounds.
This is the very image that Sister Helen was unable or unwilling to
conjure as she walked to her first encounter with Poncelet, and it
provides a devastating moment in the film, a suggestion that only by
refusing, at least initially, to contemplate the full horror of the crime
can Sister Helen, or we, muster any compassion for someone who
did what Matthew Poncelet did. The photo of the young, dead
woman demands a response from the film's viewers, just as the
prosecutor hoped it would demand a response from the pardon
board. Who did this? More critically, what kind of person could do
this? The photo works to narrow consideration, to keep the question
of responsible agency at the center of our consideration. In its
vividness and its horror it blots out almost everything else.86
A similar effect occurs when, later in the film, the parents of one of
the victims, Hope Percy, retell the story of the discovery of their
daughter's body to Sister Helen. We see Hope's body with stab
wounds clearly visible, the use of color suggesting that what we see is
an accurate recreation, not Sister Helen's incomplete imagining. "My
daughter's body," Hope's mother recounts, "was found nude, spread
eagled .... The police wouldn't let us go down to the morgue to
identify the body. They said it would be too traumatic." Sister Helen
listens intently, tears welling up in her eyes. This time the crime is
viewed from the perspective of the surviving, grieving parents, their
pain retold as if in a victim-impact statement, recounting the
gruesome way their daughter died and the consequences for their
lives.s7
Vision threatens; all reconstructions of horrible crimes astonish
their viewers. As Connolly notes, "the desire to punish crystallizes at
that point where the shocking, vicious character of a case blocks
86. See Sarat, supra note 72, at 1122.
87. On the significance of victim impact statements, see Austin Sarat, Vengeance, Victims
and the Identities of Law, 6 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 163 (1997).
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inquiry into its conditions."' A structuralist explanation, in which the
perpetrator is himself portrayed as a kind of victim, seems morally
inappropriate when confronted with the crime's horror; only
bilateral individualism supplies the stuff out of which blame and
punishment can be forged.
This reconstruction of the crime is based on the Percys'
assumption that Sister Helen has come to share their belief that
Poncelet is an "animal" who deserves to be executed for his crime.
Their characterization of Poncelet contains twin, and somewhat
contradictory, elements. In order to believe that crime merits
commensurate punishment, they must hold Poncelet responsible,
even if he does not take responsibility. He must be treated as a free
agent who could have and should have made a different choice. At
the same time, the anger that drives retributive punishment
expresses itself in the view that Poncelet is, unlike us, an animal, a
monster. Here Dead Man Walking captures something close to the
heart of the desire that always fuels punishment. Punishment, as
Connolly puts it, involves imagining the object of vengeance to be a
responsible agent who deserves whatever he gets, and, at the same
time, a dangerous monster with whom we must deal.89
When we next are brought to Sister Helen's imagining of the
crime, the question of responsible agency begins to emerge more
clearly. This is signaled by a return to black and white footage. Her
revisiting of the crime is sparked as she is driven through the prison
grounds to the special holding cell, where inmates are kept in the
days immediately before their execution. The crime is revealed as a
series of scenes interspersed with her observations of the prison.
On this occasion her view is somewhat more detailed than it had
been. We see more than weapons and legs and arms; we are now
able to identify the assailants and to see what they do. It is from this
reconstruction of the crime that a tale of responsibility can be built.
At this point, however, we must be wary because Sister Helen's
reconstruction is based on replaying what she has heard from the
Percys.
Yet she adds important details; she imagines Poncelet holding a
rifle on Walter Delacroix, while his accomplice rapes Hope Percy. In
her image Poncelet is surprised by his accomplice's brutality, scared
and spooked when he comes over, grabs the rifle, and shoots Walter.
This imagining is faithful to the story that, throughout the film,
Poncelet has told to Sister Helen. It is a version of events that
maintains some distance between him and the burden of full moral
88. WILLIAM CONNOLLY, THE ETHOS OF PLURALIZATION 47 (1995).
89. See id. at 45.
22
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol11/iss1/4
1999]
responsibility. That she believes it is testimony to her willingness to
take things on the terms on which they present themselves, the very
trait about which she was warned by the prison chaplain. As Sister
Helen later says to Poncelet, "You watched while two kids were
murdered." Throughout Poncelet insists that he is "innocent,"
having neither raped nor murdered anyone. While his claim of
innocence is not legally tenable, if true, it would diminish his moral
responsibility and invite a reappraisal of the appropriateness of his
impending punishment.
Late in the film, on the day of the execution, we finally get an
apparently complete, authoritative, visual reconstruction of the
crime. This reconstruction fixes responsibility at the same time that it
allays any doubt that we can know the truth of the crime.
Representational realism underwrites the narration of responsible
agency. This double gesture comes in response to Sister Helen's
suggestion that Poncelet "talk about what happened. Let's talk about
that night." The responding narrative is highlighted in its claim to
truth because it is again accompanied by color photography of the
crime scene. We follow Poncelet and his companion as they come
upon Walter and Hope kissing in their car. The criminals force them
out of the car by claiming that they are trespassing on private
property.'
Dead Man Walking fully reveals its modernist sensibility when
Sister Helen demands that Poncelet take responsibility for these acts.
"What possessed you," she asks, "to be in the woods that night?" "I
told you I was stoned," Poncelet responds. "Don't blame the drugs.
You could have walked away," Sister Helen replies, fully embracing
the language of agency, will, and bilateral individualism. Echoing
themes in the classic individualist tradition,91 Sister Helen insists that
the responsible agent makes choices and must accept responsibility
for those choices. "Don't blame [your accomplice]. You blame him.
You blame drugs. You blame the government. You blame blacks.
You blame the Percys. You blame the kids for being there. What
about Matthew Poncelet? Is he just an innocent, a victim?" The
language of responsibility directs attention away from the legal and
political issues surrounding capital punishment just as it refuses to
accept structure, accident, or conspiracy as justifications for actions.
It insists that, whatever the external factors that made an act
possible, it is the choice to act that is crucial.
90. This imitation of law initiates the scene of danger. Law, we are reminded, always
establishes a terrain of danger from which law itself can never fully protect us. See Dumm,
supra note 5, at 12. In this case, it is Walter and Hope's respect and fear of law that becomes
the lynchpin in their victimization.
91. See Morris, supra note 7, at 125.
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The ultimate unfolding of responsibility for the crimes in Dead
Man Walking comes in a telling just before we see the completion of
this "truest" and most complete reenactment of the crime. After his
last call to his family Poncelet says to Sister Helen:
It was something you said. I could have walked away. I didn't. I
was a victim. I was a fucking chicken. He was older and tough as
hell. I was boozing up trying to be as tough as him. I didn't have
the guts to stand up to him. I told my momma I was yellow. She
kept saying "It wasn't you. It wasn't you, Matt." [pause] The
boy, Walter, I killed him.
In this moment Poncelet takes responsibility in quite the way Sister
Helen has been urging him to do. Ultimately Sister Helen puts the
question directly. "Do you take responsibility," she asks, "for both of
their deaths (referring to Walter and Hope)?" "Yes ma'am,"
Poncelet responds. The construction of the legal subject as the
responsible subject is completed as complex, uncertain causation is
banished by a narrowly focused question and a simple response.
Sister Helen's question and Poncelet's response play out a "death
bed" confession that sets the stage for an act of contrition. His
assumption of responsibility is enacted as religious ritual and the
constitution of the responsible subject is only completed through the
intervention of spiritual necessity. The admission of guilt that law
could not secure is finally obtained. Free will and responsibility are
affirmed, and agency triumphs over structure. Poncelet's "voluntary"
assumption of responsibility reassures Dead Man Walking's viewers
of the validity of bilateral individualism and suggests that behind
every narrative of shared responsibility for crime, of structure
overcoming agency, is a deep, authentic truth about choice and
voluntary, if misguided, action.
Assuming responsibility is enacted in Dead Man Walking as a
journey in which the responsible agent comes to acknowledge that
he could have acted differently; he could have "walked away," but he
chose not to. "Subjects, we say, are 'free.' They are not bound by the
determined. They could always have done 'more' or done other than
what they did. This is the basis on which we as legal subjects can be
held legally responsible."' Yet while the discourse of responsibility
insists on autonomy, the process through which Poncelet comes to
take responsibility emphasizes his relationship to Sister Helen. "It
was something you said," he tells her. It is this relationship, with its
promise that confession leads to forgiveness, that enables Poncelet to
do what law, with its promise of punishment, was unable to get him
92. Fitzpatrick, supra note 27, at 12.
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to do. However, as Peter Brooks has recently argued:
The problem may be that the very act of confessing will so often
be the product of a situation, a set of physical conditions, and a
psychological state that do not conduce to the fullest expression
of human autonomy.... [T]he search for the true confession,
the moment of the baring of the soul, may uncover that moment
as one of human abjection. Telling the shameful truth may reap
all sorts of psycho-social benefits ... but it does not necessarily
promote an image of human autonomy and dignity. On the
contrary it reveals pathetic dependency and a kind of infantile
groveling . . . Even the most indisputably "voluntary"
confession may arise from a state of dependency, shame, and
the need for punishment, a condition that casts some doubt on
the law's language of autonomy and free choice.93
The ultimate product of his confession is Poncelet's public
acknowledgment of responsibility in the ritual of the condemned's
last words, uttered while strapped to a gurney elevated with Poncelet
in a Christ-like pose facing Walter and Hope's families: "I ask your
forgiveness. It was a terrible thing I did taking your son away from
you. I hope my death gives you some relief."
It is only as Poncelet is himself being executed that the "complete
truth" of the crime is presented visually. In this presentation we
move back and forth from the scene of the execution to the scene of
the crime. This quite literal effort to raise the question of whether
execution is a just and proportionate response to murder shows
Poncelet raping Hope and shooting Walter. The question is further
precipitated by the use of parallel images shot from above of Walter
and Hope lying face down, arms and legs spread in the woods, and
then of Poncelet lying face up, as if crucified. The film seems to ask,
are the acts the same? Or, as Justice Scalia recently argued, does
"death-by-injection... look pretty desirable next to [the murder of a
man ripped by a bullet suddenly and unexpectedly] ... How enviable
a quiet death by lethal injection compared with that."94 Does Dead
Man Walking condemn capital punishment, as Poncelet does when
he says at the time of his execution, "I think killing is wrong no
matter who does it, whether it is me, or y'all, or your government"?
Or does it provide the strongest justification for it by refusing to let
us forget the nature and brutality of the crime to which it is a
response? The film is rigorously indeterminate in its answers to these
questions.95
93. Peter Brooks, The Overborne Will, 64 REPRESENTATIONS 1, 6-8 (1998).
94. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1144 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).
95. As Harding suggests,
[b]y alternating shots between the dying Matthew and the victims the filmmaker poses
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It is not, however, indeterminate in its presentation of agency, will,
and responsibility. Like Last Dance, it affirms the perspective of
bilateral individualism against a more structural account of crime. As
Connolly suggests, this "formula politely conveys a general cultural
disposition to sacrifice socially defined others to protect the
appearance of integrity and cleanliness in the messy cultural
categories of agency and responsibility. Save the categories; waste
those whose conduct or subject position disturbs them."'96 Both Last
Dance and Dead Man Walking provide cultural affirmation of the
indispensability of responsibility against those who would blur the
distinction between criminals and victims. They refute narratives that
would implicate us all in the contingencies that produce crime and
would undermine the moral and legal scaffolding on which the
apparatus of punishment is built.
III. FETISHIZING THE TECHNIQUE AND THE REPRESENTATION OF
DEATH
At first glance, Last Dance and Dead Man Walking seem to
destabilize certain critical representational assumptions about the
extent to which we can know crime. They do so through a series of
visual reenactments, set off by particular markers to suggest their
partiality or incompleteness. Yet, eventually, both films give us views
of the crime that are identified as complete and accurate through the
use of specific visual techniques. However, no such movement from
doubt to certainty, from the partial to the complete, afflicts their
presentation of the scene of punishment. Indeed, both films are
unusually preoccupied with the techniques and technologies of
execution, showing, often in minute detail, how those technologies
work and what their effects are on the body of the condemned.
Nothing is left to the imagination as the camera zeroes in on the
apparatus of death.'
Both films play off contemporary legal prohibitions surrounding
the sight (and the site) of execution.98 They respond by playing out a
many questions to the audience. The physical position of Matthew's body resembles that
of his victims. Does that mean that Matthew is also a victim? Is it done to tell us that this
penalty is acceptable by reminding us of the victims as their killer is dying? Or, does it
mean that the death penalty is futile because all that has been accomplished is the taking
of three lives instead of two?
Harding, supra note 66, at 1176. In addition, Shapiro argues that "the movie indicates that
Poncelet confesses and is redeemed only because of his death sentence." See Shapiro, supra
note 54, at 1153.
96. Connolly, supra note 11, at 203.
97. On the priority of the imagination, see BURKE, supra note 50, at 31. See also LESSER,
supra note 3. Lesser contends that murder stories are about "what must be imagined, what
can't actually be seen-what can't, in any verifiable way, be known." Id. at 142.
98. For a discussion of those prohibitions, see Sarat & Schuster, supra note 15, at 417.
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kind of representational realism.99 It is as if they are not just
providing a rendering of reality but a rendering of a reality "made
more real by the use of aesthetic device.""° For the realist, "the
central nature of artistic activity becomes the presentation of a
reality more real than that which could be achieved by a simple
recording.1 1 Yet this realist epistemology is, at least in part,
rendered problematic by the presence in the films of witnesses to the
executions. These films remind us of what it means to see an
execution by letting us watch others watch, by alternately merging
our gaze with the witnesses depicted in the films and then separating
our gaze from theirs.
The presence of witnesses marks a difference the films insist on,
namely the difference between those who "really" see an execution
and those who have access only to its representations. Both do this
by giving the viewer a greater visual prerogative than is available to
the witnesses. We get behind-the-scenes views of the "death work"
that precedes an execution, close-up, slow-motion views of the
technology-lethal injection-in action. We see switches being
thrown, vials of lethal chemicals methodically emptying, fluid passing
through tubes into the veins of the condemned. We are spectators to
something that few are "privileged" to see.
We are made aware of our privilege because we see the witnesses
in their tightly controlled, more limited viewing. We watch them; we
are, if you will, voyeurs at someone else's voyeurism. The act of
witnessing is then held up as a kind of mirror in which the viewer is
herself captured."2 As Lesser says, referring to the prospect of
televising executions, "[i]t creates a new kind of voyeurism. We,
from the invisibility of our private living rooms, are given the
opportunity to peer into the most intimate event in someone else's
life: his death." °3 Unlike the witnesses to an execution, who are there
to be seen by the condemned just as they are to see him,1" the viewer
of death penalty films sits at a safe remove, hidden from the
condemned's gaze, real or fictive. That gaze is, of course, the gaze of
death itself; we escape it, and, as such, we can imagine ourselves not
99. A useful analysis of representational realism and its significance is found in Colin
McCabe, Theory and Film: Principles of Realism and Pleasure, in NARRATIVE, APPARATUS,
IDEOLOGY: A FILM THEORY READER 179 (Philip Rosen ed., 1986).
100. Id. at 180.
101. Id.
102. As Young notes, "[i]n film theory, analysis of the cinematic gaze pays attention to the
suturing of the audience into and by the scenes displayed on the screen." Young, supra note
68, at 32. For an example of what Young suggests, see generally TERESA DE LAURETIS,
ALICE DOESN'T: FEMINISM, SEMIOTICS, CINEMA (1984).
103. LESSER, supra note 3, at 40.
104. See Ron Steffey, Witness for the Condemned, 69 VA. Q. REv. 607 (1993). See also
Susan Blaustein, Witness to Another Execution, HARPER'S MAG., May 1994, at 53.
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being implicated in the fictive death that takes place before our eyes.
But perhaps the distinction between witness and viewer is less
stark than might at first seem apparent. As Steffey says about his
own experience of witnessing an actual electrocution, "This has to be
a Charles Bronson movie .... My thoughts even have trouble
distinguishing whether tonight was another Bronson movie or
reality."1 5 The real unreality of death at the hands of a liberal
democratic state marks the experience of witnessing and viewing.
Nonetheless, we are invited through the detailed, close-up images
that Last Dance and Dead Man Walking present to believe that we
have seen what an execution is "really like."'" Catherine Russell
suggests that:
As a symbolic act, the representation of death in film upholds
the law of the text: the believability of the image. Insofar as this
belief depends on the denial of the film's celluloid status, its
twenty-four-frames-a-second "mortal" state, the illusion of
reality sustains itself through a strict censorship of this
reminder."°
In Last Dance there is a deep and unambiguous investment in the
believability of the image of the execution. Dead Man Walking, by
contrast, plays out a somewhat more complicated representational
strategy.
In Dead Man Walking, as I suggested above, the scene of
execution is interspersed with flashbacks to the crime, and at the
moment when Poncelet dies, we see the faces of Walter and Hope
reflected in the glass window that separates the witnesses from the
death chamber. These devices partially undercut the film's
representational realism. They do so by proliferating images and
specters of death, showing how Poncelet's death is inseparable from
the deaths that he caused, and by bringing Hope and Walter to the
site of the execution itself.
In Last Dance our witnessing begins as Cindy Liggitt is transported
from the women's prison to the death house in the state's male
correctional institution. From the high-tech, modern, clean confines
of the former she descends into the archaic, fortress-like place where
death is done by the law. There we wait with her as her execution
approaches. As in many death penalty films, this one is quite literally
105. Steffey, supra note 104, at 614, 618.
106. As Fitzpatrick notes, "the site of execution.., is a place which is qualitatively
different to what surrounds it." Fitzpatrick, supra note 27, at 125. Joan Dayan says about the
death chamber, "[i]n this place of disposal, even the making of ghosts is defeated." Joan
Dayan, The Blue Room in Florence, 85 YALE REV. 27,46 (1997).
107. CATHERINE RUSSELL, NARRATIVE MORTALITY: DEATH, CLOSURE, AND NEW
WAVE CINEMAS 7-8 (1995).
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preoccupied with time, flashing scenes of clocks on the wall, marking
the inexorable process of life's march toward death. Lesser notes
that "[t]he very techniques on which the telling of a murder tale
relies-the foreshadowing, delay, irony, surprise, a sense of
determinism, the theatrical immortalization of the main character-
are techniques that play with the notion of time." ' 8
But juxtaposed against the seemingly inexorable movement of
time-the clock on the wall--is the prospect of last-minute legal or
executive intervention. Set against time is law itself, perpetrating
death but also potentially saving life. "Death," Fitzpatrick says,
"marks law's determinate being, its completeness distinct from what
is beyond, but death is a relating of law to all that is beyond ....
Thus, for every clock, there is a telephone, the silence of which
affirms the stillness of death, but which may, at any moment, come
alive to end that stillness.
As Cindy waits in the special holding cell, caught between the
clock and the telephone, the visual fetishizing of the technology of
death and the marking off of the difference between the thing itself
and its representations begin. We see the backstage work of filling
vials with lethal substances and close-ups of the vials being fitted into
the machinery that will mechanically do the job that no human is
authorized to do, of delivering those lethal substances into the body
of the condemned. When she is "escorted" into the room where she
will be put to death, we again see what the witnesses cannot see,
namely the condemned managed with military-like precision,
strapped down, needle inserted into her outstretched arm. Through
these tight shots and backstage scenes, viewers are invited to believe
that this is what an execution is "really like," even as we are
reminded that it is not a real execution that we will see. We are
brought behind the scenes so we can see, and by seeing know, what
the death penalty is and how it operates."'
It is only as the curtain separating the room where the witnesses sit
from the death chamber is opened that our view is merged with the
view of the witnesses. But our view is quickly concentrated on the
exchange of looks between Cindy and Rick. The privileged, almost
omniscient view of a moment earlier dissolves and is replaced by the
gaze of intimacy, the gaze of love. Can that look be our look? Can
108. LESSER, supra note 3, at 234.
109. Fitzpatrick, supra note 27, at 120.
110. Lesser quotes David Bruck, a prominent death penalty lawyer commenting on the
prospect of televising executions, as saying, "[tihe truth of the matter is that the public's
imagination of what this must be like-and I say this having seen two of these executions take
place-the public's imagination is much truer than what they would see on TV."' LESSER,
supra note 3, at 42. What he says about television would seem to apply with equal force to the
representational realism effected in Last Dance and Dead Man Walking.
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the viewer move from engagement with the bureaucratic and
technological details of state-administered death to embrace and
identify with the look of love? Last Dance works visually to move us
from one register of spectatorship to another, from almost clinical
detachment to loving engagement. In this move there is no other
visual space allowed. There is no space from which we can view the
execution as neither bureaucrats nor as intimates. The space of
citizenship, the juridical posture which this film otherwise seeks to
cultivate, is evaporated in the moment of execution.
In Last Dance, however, the phone does ring, and in hurried
response the execution is halted, as the warden shouts, "Stand down!
Stand down!" In this moment two things are brought together. First,
there is a lesson about the difference between the death penalty and
murder, namely that the former is subject to the continuing
normative standards and control of the community. As Cover notes,
the last-minute stay of execution reminds us that
the violence of the warden and the execution [is] linked to the
judge's deliberative act of understanding. The stay of execution,
the special line open, permits, or more accurately, requires the
inference to be drawn from the failure of the stay of
execution.... In short, it is the stay, the drama of the possibility
of the stay, that renders the execution constitutional violence."'
Second, the intervention of law ends the privilege of viewing, but
only for the witnesses. Quickly the curtains are closed, but our gaze
is neither terminated nor averted. We see Cindy, once unstrapped
and removed from the table, collapse and scream, in a rage against
her reprieve. The responsible subject having taken responsibility is
turned into the victim of a legal process whose obsession with
technical legalisms obscures issues of responsibility, justice, and
punishment."2 Cindy becomes the shrieking stand-in for a judiciary
111. Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 92 YALE L.J. 1601, 1623 (1986).
112. The much-publicized execution of Robert Alton Harris is a telling example of the
drama of the last-minute stay and of the increasing pressure to compromise law's highest
values and aspirations in order to turn death sentences into state killings. See Judge Stephen
Reinhardt, The Supreme Court, The Death Penalty, and the Harris Case, 102 YALE L.J. 205
(1992). See also Evan Camiker & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Lawless Execution of Robert Alton
Harris, 102 YALE L.J. 2225 (1992). During the twelve-hour period immediately preceding
Harris's execution, no less than four separate stays were issued by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Beneath the headline "After Night of Court Battles, a California Execution," the
April 22, 1992, edition of The New York Times reported the tangled maze of last-minute legal
maneuvers that immediately preceded the death in California's gas chamber of Robert Alton
Harris. As in many previous executions, the hope for clemency or the possibility of a stay of
execution was in Harris's case pursued until the last minute. Ultimately, in an exasperated and
unusually dramatic expression of Justice Rehnquist's aphoristic response to the seemingly
endless appeals in capital cases-"Let's get on with it"-the Supreme Court took the virtually
unprecedented, and seemingly illegal, step of ordering that "no further stays shall be
entered ... except upon order of this court." Vasquez v. Harris, 503 U.S. 1000, 1000 (1992).
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and a public increasingly outraged by such obsessions."3 Having been
ready to die in the consolation of Rick's gaze, she is wrenched back
into life by a legal process that neither she, nor we, respect.
It is, of course, Rick's last-minute, frantic efforts to find the one
sympathetic judge who might grant a stay that led to the excruciating
agony of Cindy's last-minute rescue. She screams because she knows
what the ultimate outcome will be, that she and we will return to the
death chamber. But before her return, before the stay is lifted, Cindy
talks about the redeeming power of the gaze, of a certain form of
spectatorship. "I saw you," she says to Rick, "I could feel your eyes
on me. I wasn't scared." After the stay is lifted she says "You have
got to let me go now. Please... [d]on't take your eyes off of me."
What redeems is that the spectator can himself be seen, that his gaze
can be returned. Such a redeeming power, however, is not available
to us. We are reminded, as if we need reminding, of our distance, our
safe disengagement, of the limits of our power and role as
spectators."'
When Cindy is subsequently returned to the death chamber there
is no last-minute reprieve. The execution resumes as does our
encounter with the machinery of death. We are given another
extreme close-up as the procedure for dispensing the lethal
chemicals proceeds. First one vial, then another is emptied in a slow-
motion sequence that echoes the slow motion of our two views of the
scene of the crime. But unlike the violence that Cindy dispensed, the
violence done to her is bloodless, antiseptic, accompanied by no
shouted obscenities."' No human hand is seen. Death comes through
the automatic operation of a machine. We are again brought to a
scene of death, given the illusion of seeing what is generally
forbidden, and through that seeing the illusion of knowing death.
In this scene viewers are positioned as seekers of knowledge that
The Court scolded Harris's lawyers for "abusive delay which has been compounded by last
minute attempts to manipulate the judicial process." N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1992, at 22. In so
doing it displaced Harris as the soon-to-be victim of law, and portrayed law itself as the victim
of Harris and his manipulative lawyers. To defend the virtue of law required an assertion of the
Court's supremacy against both the vexatious sympathies of other courts and the efforts of
Harris and his lawyers to keep alive a dialogue about death. With this order, the Court stopped
the talk and took upon itself the responsibility for Harris's execution.
113. For an interesting analysis of this public outrage and its translation into judicial
opinions, see Anthony Amsterdam, Selling a Quick Fill for Boot Hill: The Myth of Justice
Delayed in Death Cases, in THE KILLING STATE, supra note 8, at 148.
114. See Laura Mulvey, Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema, in NARRATIVE,
APPARATUS, IDEOLOGY, supra note 99, at 201.
115. Cindy Liggitt dies with a single gasp, her face reflected in the glass through which
Rick and we see her death. She dies in his eyes, and through him, in ours. Death is given its
meaning, redeemed, through acts of viewing. However, unlike Rick, whose presence is crucial
to Cindy, the witnessing audience to the film of an execution "becomes... a non-existent
presence, an invisible crowd of spectators who yield up nothing on behalf of the performer."
LESSER, supra note 3, at 205.
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we can never attain, knowledge of death itself. What Lesser says
about the desire to see an execution is the desire that Last Dance's
fetishizing of technique seeks to satisfy. "We want . . . [the
condemned] to enact something for us; we want to live the terror of
death through him [or her], and then be able to leave it safely
behind." 6 Yet the representational realism of the execution
promises a knowledge it cannot produce. "Death remains ever
beyond us... 7 Seeing an image of the technology in action cannot
produce for us the experience of the death that technology produces.
Like Last Dance, Dead Man Walking fetishizes the technology of
death. It too uses the extreme close-up of the machinery of death to
bring us behind the scenes at an execution. But, unlike Last Dance,
its representational strategy is more unsettling to the viewer, who is
brought to and then away from the execution, and who is, through
that gesture, not allowed to forget the fictive quality of what he sees.
Unlike Last Dance, what we see of the preparations for the
execution initially is seen only through Sister Helen's eyes; we get no
privileged preview. We watch as she catches a glimpse of the death-
squad practicing its drill, asks about the witness forms and sees
preparations being made to feed the witnesses before the execution.
We later see the distress on her face when she sees them eating,
distress that registers the cruel juxtaposition of their preoccupation
with life's necessities even as they are about to see the end of life.
We follow as she is led into the witness room. It is only then that our
gaze is separated from hers.
In this moment of separation the privileged position of the film's
viewer is reasserted. We see Poncelet strapped to the table and a
nurse searching for a vein into which she inserts the IV tube that will
soon carry the substances that will end his life. Over her shoulder we
catch a brief sight of the vials containing those substances. But from
here our gaze is now fixed on the witnesses, as the camera pans from
Sister Helen to the faces of the families of the victims. For a moment
it seems as if our choice is to see the scene of execution through one
or another of these sets of eyes. But in the back row we can see an
unidentified, impassive female face. In her anonymity and distance,
the viewer is reminded of his or her position, poised looking at the
execution from further away than either Sister Helen, Mr. Delacroix,
or the Percys. We are again made aware of the fact that executions
are today, as they always have been, about a particular form of
spectatorship. We are again invited to believe that we will see and,
through our seeing, come to know more than those whose witnessing
116. Id. at 60.
117. Fitzpatrick, supra note 27, at 119.
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is so tightly controlled.
But the camera shifts, fixing its gaze on the eyes first of Poncelet
and then of Sister Helen. They stare into each other's eyes; their
truest connection is expressed in what they see. But his gaze is also
fixed on us. He watches and in his look seems to ask how we will see
him. Finally, as in Last Dance, we are given first one close-up, and
then an even more intense view, of the vials. The camera follows the
lethal substances as they leave the vials, travel through the tube into
Poncelet's arm, and to his head. We follow as if we too could enter
his consciousness and know in the last minutes what it is like to lose
consciousness forever. The visual device is quite stark in its invitation
to exchange positions, if only for a minute, with the condemned in
order to possess and bring back knowledge forbidden to the living.
Like Cindy Liggitt, Poncelet dies quietly, as if falling gently to sleep.
Only in this moment is his gaze ended and ours released.
In both Last Dance and Dead Man Walking, the scenes of
execution, of an execution presented as if the act of a machine, are
stripped of grandeur. How far have we come, these films seem to say,
from the awe-inspiring majesty of the scaffold? There is, in fact, now
almost nothing to see. Death comes quickly; it leaves no visible
signature of the body of the condemned. We are invited to see that
there is nothing to see in the bureaucratization and medicalization of
death.11s
Yet the sight of execution is, in this age, always a moment of
transgression. In this transgression there is a mixture of fear and
pleasure, of what we know and what we cannot know. This is
especially true of the seeing that exceeds the carefully controlled
visual field of the witnesses; such sight is a fleeting refusal to
acquiesce in the state's definition of the death that it dispenses and in
its determined effort to regulate the privilege of seeing. In addition,
the representation of death in films like Last Dance and Dead Man
Walking is "a harbinger of mortality .... But it is also, at the same
time, a means of disavowing this recognition. 119 We are reminded
that we too will die and that our death may be as untimely and
gruesome as the deaths we are shown. Yet because as film viewers
we confront death from a distance, we are allowed to walk away
unscathed.
As in Last Dance, the preoccupation with the act of witnessing and
the focus on the gaze in Dead Man Walking suggest that even a
118. This theme is explored in Michael Madow, Forbidden Spectacle: Executions, the
Public and the Press in Nineteenth-Century New York, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 461 (1995).
119. RUSSELL, supra note 107, at 24. This disavowal occurs in Dead Man Walking's visual
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bureaucratized, medicalized execution "is-as Foucault implied-
more of a show, spectacle, and theater than a closed structure."'
2
Show, spectacle, theater-these representational media are central
to the rituals of execution. But by focusing on the act of watching
and by fetishizing the technologies of death, both Last Dance and
Dead Man Walking play out the limits of representation itself, limits
imposed by law (the prohibition of televising executions) and life
(the unknowability of death). "The ability to produce the spectacle
of death," Russell argues, "is both a discourse of control and of
transgression. An uncanny conjunction of crisis and possibility,
narrative mortality delineates the threshold of the representable.'
1 21
These films want to give us what life itself will not allow. They
domesticate the death penalty and allow us to believe that we can
know what the state does in our name, that we can measure the
effects of capital punishment, and that in that act we can precisely fix
the balance of pains necessary to make the punishment fit the crime.
IV. CONCLUSION
Last Dance and Dead Man Walking, I have argued, are
meditations on responsibility and representation. They juxtapose
crime and punishment as a figuration of law's commitment to
proportionality and, in so doing, affirm bilateral individualism
against more radical, structuralist accounts of crime. They make
clear the distinction between being legally responsible and taking
responsibility. In this distinction they chart a space in which the
modern legal subject can be said to reside, a space of individual
autonomy, choice, and desert, a space in which those who take
responsibility are accorded "the right to make promises. '122 Despite
their "transgressive" efforts to visually represent the sites and
processes of execution, they redeem their central characters -Liggitt
and Poncelet -through the high moralist discourse of a believing
world, a world not yet willing or able to come to terms with its
disenchantment. In this sense they embody a conservative cultural
politics, one quite unwilling to explore the instability of the very
categories on which the modern apparatus of punishment depends.
The films, and the cultural politics in which they participate, resist
the developments and possibilities of postmodernity, which
fragments identities, exposes contingencies, and opens up new
possibilities of human connection.'" Punishment, as represented in
120. Id. at 48.
121. Id. at 46.
122. NIETZSCHE, supra note 4, at 189.
123. See JEAN FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION (Geoff Bennington
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Last Dance and Dead Man Walking, demands that we know who the
criminals and the victims are, and that we know the difference
between them. It refuses contingency and interdependence and
insists that the conditions of failure that accompany brutality are
irrelevant to the question of responsibility. These films show, without
critiquing, the ways those whose identities are jeopardized by the
play of difference and contingency in postmodernity construct
objects of resentment to protect the identities thus jeopardized."
Contingency in identity, Connolly claims, requires that we
acknowledge tragic possibilities in the life of the individual. To
take one instance, one might have violent, destructive
dispositions inscribed in oneself, dispositions neither chosen in
the past nor susceptible to reconstruction now.... Typically it is
unclear in such cases whether failure [to control those
dispositions] represents a refusal, an inability, or a complex
unamenable to these fixed categories.'25
Neither Last Dance nor Dead Man Walking engages the tragic
possibilities Connolly describes or the instabilities that lie at the
heart of modern conceptions of responsibility.
What I am calling the conservative cultural politics of these films is
also reflected in the way they position the viewer and in the
consequences of that positioning. While viewers are positioned in
several different ways in both films-as investigators, truth seekers,
voyeurs-the basic structure of viewing is juridical. Though neither
film takes us into a courtroom, they invite the spectators to judge as
if they were making a life and death judgment. As Carol Clover
notes,
[Anglo-American] movies are already trial-like to begin
with .... [T]he plot structures and narrative procedures... of a
broad stripe of American popular culture are derived from the
structure and procedures of the Anglo-American trial ...
[T]his structure and these procedures are so deeply embedded
in our narrative tradition that they shape even plots that never
step into a courtroom .... 126
The juridical role offered to the spectator of these films is, however,
not the role of adjudicator of guilt or innocence; instead we sit as if
on a jury in the penalty phase of a capital trial.
The films' brief reconstructions of the lives of the condemned and
& Brian Massumi trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 1984) (1979).
124. See WILLIAM CONNOLLY, IDENTITY/DIFFERENCE: DEMOCRATIC NEGOTIATIONS OF
POLITICAL PARADOX 209 (1991).
125. Id. at 179-80.
126. Carol J. Clover, Law and the Order of Popular Culture, in LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF
CULTURE 97, 99-100 (Austin Sarat & Thomas Kearns eds., 1998).
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the reasons for their acts play out evidence in mitigation. Through
their extensive focus on the brutality of the crime and the suffering
of those left behind, we are presented with the aggravating factors. If
Liggitt and Poncelet take responsibility for their brutal acts, then, the
films seem to ask, are they worthy of mercy? Or is the only mercy
that can and should be provided God's mercy, not ours?
The consequence of this juridical role is to bracket, or to derogate,
broader questions about the legitimacy and meaning of capital
punishment and to focus our attention on the particularities of a
single case. The bracketing of these questions is recognizable in
certain silences in both films as well as in the way they portray the
political and legal controversy surrounding capital punishment.
Toward the end of Last Dance the political controversy surrounding
the legality and morality of capital punishment appears in a series of
scenes focused on the gathering of pro- and anti-capital punishment
groups outside the prison where Cindy Liggitt is to be executed.
Those scenes suggest the simultaneous routinization and irrationality
that lie at the heart of all such gatherings-routinization in the sense
that they are part of the ritual and "ceremony" surrounding every
execution and irrationality when they erupt into angry shouting.127
In Dead Man Walking the gathering of demonstrators plays a
smaller role in the controversy surrounding capital punishment. We
are shown a brief scene of Sister Helen in a candlelight vigil at the
execution immediately preceding Poncelet's; there we also see the
parents of his victims strongly defending the right of the state to use
the death penalty. "It is the only way we can ensure that they won't
kill again," says Mr. Delacroix during a television interview outside
the prison. "These people are mad dogs, maniacs," adds Hope's
father. The clearest political message against capital punishment is
delivered in Dead Man Walking by the least credible speaker,
Matthew Poncelet, when, as his last words, he says "I think killing is
wrong no matter who does, me, y'all, or your government."
Each of these scenes seems jarring, out of place in films that focus
so intently on the question of whether a single person deserves to die
for her or his crimes. That biographical focus invites the viewer to
accept, in a spirit of resignation if not celebration, the legal and
political status quo. Thus, cultural conservatism ends up serving the
cause of legal and political conservatism. In both films
the basic categories through which we judge murderers and
127. The shouting of the demonstrators is contrasted with the cool dispassion of the death
squad that manages Cindy during her execution. In addition, a close-up of two nuns carrying
signs that say "Thou Shalt Not Kill" suggests the ironic indeterminacy of a message that could
apply with equal force either to Liggitt or to the state that is about to kill her.
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assess penalties are themselves treated as stable and unshakable.
The harsh childhood of the killer, for instance, is taken to
"mitigate" the crime or to provide "extenuating" circumstances;
but these experiences are not treated as elements that may enter
into the very formation of the perpetrator's will itself.28
Last Dance and Dead Man Walking legitimate capital punishment by
insisting that all that counts is the question of responsibility and by
deploying representational strategies designed to convince their
viewers that they can know the reality of the death penalty and, as a
result, assess its proportionality.
The cultural conservativism of these films is seen as well in the way
they depend on a representational realism about execution and in
their confidence in the possibility of conveying, through sight, its
meaning. Last Dance and Dead Man Walking use a model of sight
and vision in which the visual is rendered reliable and stable, in
which vision is privileged in its access to the truth of things, and in
which visual connections have the power to soothe and redeem.
Yet there are at least two suggestions to the contrary that call into
question the representational realism on which the films depend.
First, as I have already noted, is the juxtaposition of the past and
present, the embodied and the spectral in the execution scenes of
Dead Man Walking. Second is the description that Poncelet provides
to Sister Helen of the way lethal injection works, with the first
chemical designed to tranquilize such that the horrible physical
effects of the remaining chemicals are not registered on the body of
the condemned.
In this description we are reminded that the visual field of the
modern execution, the fact that there is "nothing to see," depends on
a technologically induced condition. Yet it is another such condition,
film itself, with its angles, pans, and close-ups, that produces the
illusion that seeing is knowing, 29 that to see an execution enacted in
film is to know the meaning of death at the hands of the state.
As I have argued, death, whatever its cause, marks the limits of
representation. Films can neither capture death nor help us know
what cannot be known. We can and do watch others die without
being able to capture death's meaning or significance. Yet neither
Last Dance nor Dead Man Walking acknowledge that "both death
and film are negotiations with absence, and that the representation
of violent death in film constitutes a special crisis of believability, a
128. CONNOLLY, supra note 124, at 199.
129. See Stephen Heath, Narrative Space, in NARRATIVE, APPARATUS, IDEOLOGY, supra
note 99, at 379.
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threshold of realism and its own critique." 3' In the end, whatever our
particular judgments about whether their main characters are
justifiably or unjustifiably condemned to death, neither film invites
us to do more than comfortably embrace the conceptual categories
of responsibility and representation that justify the apparatus of
criminal punishment and keep the machinery of state killing in place
and operating.
130. RUSSELL, supra note 107, at 23. The "violent deaths" to which Russell refers apply
both to the death of the victims and to the executions in Last Dance and Dead Man Walking.
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